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HABAs CoaRpus-RIGHT OF Ar-
PEA.-[Ilinois]- Relator was ar-
rested on a warrant issued by the
Governor of Illinois for his rendi-
tion on the requisition of the Gov-
ernor of Wisconsin, in which state
he was wanted for arson. On a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
relator merely testified that he was
not in Wisconsin on the day when
the crime was allegedly committed.
Though two witnesses testified to
the contrary, the trial court dis-
charged the relator. On appeal,
reversed. Held: The trial court
cannot discharge one arrested un-
der a governor's warrant where
the evidence relating to the sub-
ject of presence in or absence from
the state is contradictory, inasmuch
as habeas corpus is not a proper
proceeding in which to try the
question of alibi or the guilt or
innocence of the accused. People
ex rel. Sedlack v. Toman, Sheriff,
362 Ill. 516, 200 N. E. 331 (1936).
Strictly speaking, the writ of
habeas corpus is not an action or
a suit, but rather a summary rem-
edy open to the person detained.
Orr v. Jackson, 149 Iowa 641, 128
N. W. 958 (1910); Arnold v.
Schmidt, 155 Wis. 55, 143 N. W.
1055 (1913). Its great object is
the speedy liberation of those who
may be imprisoned without suffi-
cient cause. Henry v. Henkel, 235
U. S. 219 (1914); Belch v. Man-
ning, 55 Fla. 229, 46 So. 91 (1908);
People v. Windes, 283 Ill. 251, 119
N. E. 297 (1918); People v. Kuhne,
107 N. Y. 1020 (1907).
The weight of authority seems to
be to the effect that, in the absence
of statutory provision, no order or
judgment in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings is reviewable on appeal
or writ of error. People v. Siman,
284 Ill. 28, 119 N. E. 940 (1918);
In re Webers, 275 Mo. 677, 205 S.
W. 620 (1918); Ex parte Logan, 33
OkL. 659, 126 Pac. 800 (1912); Rex
v. Buxton, 2 K. B. 1056 (1910).
The decisions are based either on
the ground that the order or judg-
ment in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing does not possess the finality or
other attributes necessary to bring
it within the scope of the statutes
permitting appeals or writs of er-
ror, or upon the more substantive
ground that the delay incident to
appeals would tend to defeat the
purpose of habeas corpus-a speedy
remedy to the person unlawfully
imprisoned. See State v. Towery,
143 Ala. 48, 39 So. 309 (1904); In
re Hughes, 159 Cal. 360, 113 Pac.
684 (1911); Martin v. District
Court, 37 Colo. 110, 86 Pac. 82
(1906); In re Williams, 149 N. C.
436, 63 S. E. 108 (1908). Where
the order has refused the release
of the prisoner, the ground for not
[277]
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allowing an appeal on the part of
the petitioner is the fact that the
order is not final and he may seek
his release again, with the earlier
order not standing as a bar. Only
a few jurisdictions permit review
without express statutory author-
ization, and apparently limit its
availability only to the state. Gil-
lard v. Clark, 105 Neb. 84, 179 N.
W. 396 (1920); People v. Kaiser,
206 N. Y. 46, 99 N. E. 195 (1912);
Garftnkle v. Sullivan, 37 Wash.
650, 80 Pac. 188 (1905); Harkrader
v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148 (1898).
Statutory provisions have been
made in some jurisdictions provid-
ing for an appeal on habeas corpus,
though not all of them give such a
right when the petitioner is dis-
charged. There is a conflict of au-
thority as to whether appeals may
be taken from a discharge in ha-
beas corpus cases under a general
statute relating to appeals, or
whether such cases must be spe-
cifically mentioned. The tendency
has been to deny the privilege ex-
cept when specifically granted.
State v. Berkstresser, 137 Ala. 109,
34 So. 686 (1902); Notesten v.
Rogers, 18 N. M. 462, 138 Pac. 207
(1914); Wesiner v. Burrell, 28 Okla.
546, 118 Pac. 999 (1911).
The present case, of course,
arose in connection with inter-
state extradition, which is wholly
governed by constitution and stat-
utory provisions. Courts have held
that on a hearing on a writ of ha-
beas corpus in such a case, they
may consider only the following:
whether the prisoner falls under
the conditions of the federal stat-
ute; whether he is the person
charged; whether the papers are
sufficient under the law to justify a
warrant of extradition. People v.
Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. E. 825
(1902); 'Work v. Corrington, 34
Ohio St. 64 (1877); Ex parte Mas-
see, 95 S. C. 315, 79 S. E. 97 (1913).
The judicial inquiry, however, can-
not extend to the motive of the ex-
tradition proceedings. Barranger
v. Baum, 103 Ga. 465, 30 S. E. 524
(1898). Likewise, the court will
not go into the merits of the case
or determine the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused. Drew v.
Thaw, 235 U. S. 432 (1914); State
v. Justus, 84 Minn. 237, 87 N. W.
770 (1901); Commonwealth v.
Philadelphia County Prison, 220
Pa. St. 401, 69 AtL 916 (1908).
Finally, courts, as in the instant
case, say that a person should not
be discharged where there is
merely contradictory evidence on
the subject of his presence in or
absence from the state. Munsey
v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364 (1905);
Dennison v. Christian, 72 Neb.
703, 101 N. W. 1045 (1904).
It would thus seem that, con-
sidering the nature of extradition
proceedings, perhaps the instant
court was correct in reversing the
order of discharge. But, however
desirable such a result is, the court
clearly disregarded the prevailing
view as to the writ of habeas cor-
pus. The cases cited in the opin-
ion are all cases where the appeal
was taken by the petitioner from
an order refusing discharge. Peo-
ple ex rel. v. Meyering, 349 Ill. 198,
181 N. E. 620 (1932); People ex rel.
v. Traeger, 340 Ill. 147, 172 N. E.
168 (1930); People ex rel. v. Mey-
ering, 345 Ill. 449, 178 N. E. 80
(1931). The court disregarded the
case of People v. Siman, supra.
There Wr. Justice Duncan said:
"It is now the well settled doctrine
of this court [Illinois] that no writ
of error lies to review the order or
judgment of a court or judge in a
habeas corpus proceeding, for the
discharge of a prisoner in a crim-
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inal case, as the order or judgment
is not a final order or judgment.-
No appeal from such an order has
been granted by any statute in this
State, and consequently no appeal
is permissible from such an order
or judgment."
The better reasoning seems to be
that a writ of error or appeal will
not lie in behalf of the state to re-
view an order or judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction, in
habeas corpus proceedings dis-
charging from custody the peti-
tioner. Keeping in mind the orig-
inal purpose of the writ, it is in-
deed difficult to perceive the wis-
dom or reason upon which statutes
and decisions are based which al-
low an appeal in such cases. The
delay which might, and generally
would, attend the appeal in many
cases would work a denial of the
very object of the writ, which is to
secure the present discharge of the
prisoner, and in most cases its
value would be so impaired as to
lose that distinctive character and
office with which it has always
been clothed.
Lr E. PImEc.
CoMMENT ON FAILuR To TESTIFY
-CoNsTrTUTIoNAI=Y OF STATUTE
so PnovDmo - [South Dakota]
During a trial, in accordance with
a South Dakota statute (Laws 1927,
c. 93), expressly providing that in
a criminal case "defendant's fail-
ure to testify in his own behalf is
hereby declared to be a proper
subject of comment by the prose-
cuting attorney," the prosecutor
commented on the defendant's fail-
ure to testify. The defendant wa1
convicted. On appeal, reversed.
Held: Statute is unconstitutional as
it violates section 9 of Article 6 of
the South Dakota constitution
279 -
which provides that "no person
shall be compelled in any criminal
case to give evidence against him-
self." State v. Wolfe, 266 N. W.
116 (S. D. 1936).
The Fifth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution provides
against self-incrimination and all
the states have similar constitu-
tional provisions except New Jer-
sey and Iowa, which, nevertheless
grant this privilege by virtue of
the common law. State v. Zdano-
wiscz, 69 N. J. L. 619, 53 AtL 1047
(1903); State v. Height, 117 Iowa
650, 91 N. W. 935 (1902). Until
recent times, under the common
law, the accused was not permitted
to testify. In 1864 Maine passed
the first competency act "the per-
son so charged shall at his own re-
quest but not otherwise be deemed
a competent witness," ME. STAT.
(1864) c. 280. Maine was followed
by all the states save Georgia. GA.
AN. CODE (Park 1914) §1037. Al-
most all these statutes, while quali-
fying the defendant to testify, pro-
vide that failure to testify shall not
create a presumption against the
defendant, and this provision is
construed to forbid comment.
Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass.
239 (1877); State v. Garrington, 11
S. D. 178, 76 N. W. 326 (1877); cf.
State v. Monohan, 96 Conn. 289,
114 Atl. 102 (1921) (Statute ex-
pressly forbids comment).
Even in the absence of a statute
providing against comment or the
raising of a presumption, Virginia,
South Carolina and Georgia deny
such comment on the grounds that
it violates the constitutional priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and
deprives accused of the presump-
tion of innocence to which he is
entitled. Price v. Commonwealth,
77 Va. 393 (1883); State v. Howard,
35 S. C. 197 (1891); Coleman v.
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State, 93 S. E. 154, 15 Ga. A. 338
(1914)". The United States Su-
preme Court, however, has de-
cided that there is nothing in the
Federal Constitution to prevent the
states from permitting comment on
a failure to testify. See Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
Very few states permit comment
on a failure to testify. Parker v.
State, 61 N. J. L. 308, 39 A. 651
(1898); Patterson v. State, 122
Ohio 96, 171 N. E. 26 (1930); State
v. Stennett, 260 N. W. 732 (Iowa,
1935); State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298
(1871). It must be remembered,
however, that New Jersey and
Iowa have no constitutional pro-
vision against self-incrimination,
nor any statute forbidding com-
ment. (IowA CODE (1927) §13891
repealed at 43rd Gen. Ass. c. 269.)
Ohio by constitutional amendment
provides for comment on failure to
testify. OHtO CONST. Art. I,, §10.
Four years later, however, the
Ohio court felt obliged to say that
the aforesaid amendment was not
intended to aid the prosecution or
to lessen the proof required on be-
half of the prosecution. See
Parker v. Village of Dover, 98
Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 465, 472 (1916).
Maine, in State v. Cleaves, supra,
held that there may be comment on
the defendant's silence; however,
the legislature later enacted that
the defendant on cross-examina-
tion should not be compelled to
testify to facts that would tend to
convict him of any crime, other
than that for which he was on trial.
Act of Feb. 14, 1879, c. 92, p. 112.
South Dakota is the only state
with the normal constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination
which has attempted by statute to
permit comment. In decisions prior
to the statute of 1927 the court
ruled that comment by the prose-
cutor was reversible error. State
v. Garrington, 11 S. D. 178, 76 N.
W. 326 (1898); State v. Sonnen-
schein, 373 S. D. 585, 159 N. W.
101 (1916); State v. Lindec, 51 S.
D. 516, 215 N. W. 495 (1927).
The function of the constitu-
tional provision against self-in-
crimination, so far as the individual
is concerned, is to guarantee to the
accused that he will not be forced
by positive present act or word to
furnish, produce, or make evidence
to be used against himself. See
Dills, Comment on Failure to Tes-
tify (1928) 3 Wash. L. Rev. 161,
164. The ultimate ground of policy
as regards the state is to prevent
the prosecution from relying for
proof of its case upon evidence ob-
tained from the accused. See 4
Wigmore, EvmENc. (2nd ed. 1923)
§2272.
The reasoning of the majority of
the court in the instant case is that
the effect of the statute permitting
comment is to deprive the defend-
ant of the option of testifying. If
he does take the stand he is sub-
jected to gruelling cross-examina-
tion which detracts largely from
the weight of his testimony as evi-
dence. See State v. Garrington,
supra at 188. If he exercises his
supposed privilege of not testify-
ing, the prosecution draws an in-
ference of guilt from his silence,
which inference, at least to the ex-
tent of the weight given to it by
the jury, is an incrimination of
himself by the accused. See Peo-
ple v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 523, 530 (1869).
To choose between two evils is
certainly not the true option in-
tended by the constitutional pro-
vision.
The minority, however, points
out, as the late Judge Andrew
Bruce observed, that the constitu-
tional provision against self-in-
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crimination was aimed only against
direct compulsion, and does not go
to the extent of prohibiting com-
ment. See Bruce, The Right to
Comment on the Failure of the De-
fendant to Testify, 31 Mich. L. Rev.
226, 233 (1932), which is a reply to
Reeder, Comment on Failure of
Accused to Testify, 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 40 (1932) (two excellent dis-
cussions of this problem). Sec-
ondly, the minority contends that
nothing the prosecution can say
will either add or detract very
much from the impression the jury
already has of the defendant's fail-
ure to take the stand on his own
behalf. The jury's reaction "is
natural and irresistible. It will be
drawn by honest jurymen and no
instruction will prevent it." Parker
v. State, 61 N. J. L. 308, 39 AtL 651
(1898). Thirdly, as a matter of
serving the best ends of justice, a
jury should be permitted to con-
sider as one evidentiary fact in the
determination of the guilt or in-
nocence of the accused his failure
to testify-the probative effect of
which will vary according to vary-
ing circumstances in different
trials. This does not appear to be
unfair to the accused. "If inno-
cent, he has every inducement to
state the facts, which would exon-
erate him. The truth would be his
protection. There can be no rea-
son why he should withhold it, and
every reason for its utterance. Be-
ing guilty, . . . a statement of the
truth would lead to his conviction,
and justice would ensue." State
v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298 (1871).
The logic of the dissent appears
to undermine the position of the
majority, and in the light of adop-
tion of resolutions by both the
American Law Institute (9 Proc.
Am. L. Inst. 202-218 (1931) and
the American Bar Association (56
A. B. A. Rep. 137-152 (1931) rec-
ommending that comment be per-
mitted on the failure of the ac-
cused to testify, the majority hold-
ing seems questionable and retro-
gressive.
GERTRUD SIn.R.
UsE oF SvMoL "CAN/oR" IN IN-
DICTMENT As REVERSIBLE ERROR.-
[Texas] Accused was found guilty
under an indictment charging him
with keeping a place to bet and
wager and to "gamble cards, dice
and/or dominoes" and as a place
where people resorted to "gamble,
bet and wager on games played
with cards, dice and/or dominoes."
On appeal, reversed. Held: In-
dictment quashable for use of sym-
bol "and/or" and for omission of
the word "with" before the words
"cards, dice and/or dominoes."
Compton v. State, 91 S. W. (2d)
732 (Tex. Cr. App. 1936).
The objection to the indictment
having been properly raised by a
motion to quash, Cohn v. United
States, 258 Fed. 355 (C. C. A. 2d,
1919), the court reversed on finding
grounds for the motion. It is a
well settled rule that no one count
in an indictment may charge a per-
son with more than one offense,
and if done the indictment is bad
for duplicity. 2 Moore (1932) Illi-
nois Criminal Law and Procedure
812. It is also an elementary prin-
ciple that an indictment must not
charge offenses in the alternative,
since the defendant cannot then
know precisely with what he is
charged or convicted so as to pre-
clude a second prosecution for the
same offense. Tyompies Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 211 Fed.
385 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914). However,
it is not always easy to decide what
is "one offense" within the mean-
ing of the rule concerning duplic-
ity. It would appear that where
the crime charged relates to one
act, or series of acts pertaining to
one transaction, it would not un-
der the rule be duplicitous for
mentioning the several acts, things
or persons connected therewith.
For example, a count charging the
theft of a horse at one time and the
buggy at another has been held
bad for duplicity. But a count
charging theft of a horse and buggy
at the same time is not duplicitous.
People v. Waters, 104 Ill. 544
(1882). On the other hand, if al-
ternate forms of words describe
offenses whose ingredients are not
the same, and more than one of-
fense is used, the indictment must
be amended or the conviction
quashed, and that whether the link
between the formulae be "or" or
"and." Neither uncertainty nor
duplicity is removed by the use of
"and" if more than one offense is
charged. 75 Sol. J. 788. Hence the
determining question, and the one
on which the principal case turns,
is one of "certainty."
In holding that the primary
requisite of criminal pleading is
definiteness and certainty, so that
nothing is left to inference or in-
tendment, the court places great
weight on the case of Tarjan v.
National Surety Co., 268 IM. App.
232 (1932), a non-criminal case,
and in doing so has garnered the
support of a court that has vigor-
ously opposed the use of such sym-
bols as "and/or" and "was/were."
The Illinois appellate court in an
opinion subsequent to the one cited
in the principal case (City Na-
tional Bank and Trust Co. v. Davis
Hotel Corp., 280 IM. App. 247
(1935)), cites at length the cases
in which they have condemned
what they call "the pollution of our
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language through the use of such
symbols." (See also the very re-
cent case of Albers v. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 283 Ill. App. 260 (1935).)
The use of these symbols has been
condemned by the courts of sev-
eral states: by Alabama in Cla.j
County Abstract Co. v. McKay, 226
Ala. 394, 147 So. 407 (1933); by
Louisiana in State v. Dudley, 159
La. 872, 106 So. 364 (1925); by Utah
in Putnam v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 80 Utah 187, 14 P. (2d) 973
(1932); by Nevada in Ex Parte
Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 Pac.
(2d) 284 (1934); by the Federal
courts in Irving Trust Co. v. Rose,
67 Fed. (2d) 89 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933),
and by the American Bar Associa-
tion in its Journal of July, August,
September, and October, 1932. The
reason for this condemnation is
rather well stated in an Oregon
case, Kronbrodt v. Equitable Trust
Co., 137 Ore. 368, 2 P. (2d) 236,
3 P. (2d) 127 (1931), wherein the
court said: "The words 'and' and
'or' are not interchangeable terms,
nor are they convertable. It often
happens to preserve the sense it is
necessary to construe 'and' as 'or'
and 'or' as 'and,' but this is done
only when it is necessary to do so
in order to carry out an obvious
intent as shown by the context and
to avoid an absurdity. They never
mean the same thing." It is also
held that "and" and "or" when
combined ought never be used in
a pleading. Macurda v. Lewistown
Journal Co., 104 Me. 554, 72 Atl.
490 (1908); STEvENS, PLEADINa (3d
Am. Ed. 1882) 340.
Though the decisions have been
strong in their condemnation of
the use of the symbols, apparently
but one case of those cited, the
Putnam case, supra, was reversed
only because the use of the symbol
rendered the offense uncertain. All
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the rest have expressed their ob-
jections merely by obiter dicta
while passing to decide the case on
its merits, or have reversed where
there was also another ground on
which to do so.
The indictment in the principal
case was apparently framed under
Section 625 of the Texas Criminal
Statutes, entitled "Keeping." The
statute reads, '"f any person shall
keep or be in any manner inter-
ested in keeping any premises,
building, room or place for the
purpose of being used- as a place
to bet or wager, or to gamble with
cards, dice or dominoes, or to
keep - etc." Since the crime
charged is for keeping a place to
gamble one may well inquire: Did
the use of the symbol in the in-
dictment or the omission of the
word "with" cause uncertainty as
to what crime was charged? It
seems not-and under the rules of
surplusage, the indictment if not
otherwise vitiated is good regard-
less of the surplus part (Bailey v.
United States, 269 U. S. 551
(1925)), which may be stricken.
People v. Osborne, 278 Ill. 104, 147
N. R 124 (1925). The instant de-
cision may perhaps be sustained as
a valiant defense of the proper
usage of the English language, but
it is open to serious question
whether a grammatical impropri-
ety, however egregious, should
alone be the basis of a reversal.
Though the court was -uncertain
whether or not the place was used
for betting at one or the other
games mentioned in the indict-
ment, a sounder result would have
been reached by poising the case
for judgment on the issue of du-
plicity-does the indictment use a
form of words which discloses
more than one offense-or by fol-
lowing the federal rule, which
holds an indictment sufficient if it
states the essential elements of an
offense with such reasonable par-
ticularity as will advise the deiend-
ant with reasonable certainty of
the nature of the accusation, and
thus enable him to prepare his de-
fense. United States v. Goldman,
220 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915);
see also, United States v. Aviles,
222 Fed. 474 .(D. C. Cal. 1915);
People v. Eflis, 185 Ill. App. 417,
420 (1914); Simpson v. United
States, 289 Fed. 188 (C. C. A. 9th,
1923), cert. denied, 263 U. S. 707
(1923). Since the crime charged is
for "keeping" a gambling house,
it would seem that confusion as to
exactly what forms of gambling
were therein carried out would be
no ground upon which to raise the
objection if it is clear that any one
game included under the statute is
sufficiently set forth so as to veri-




PRMSON-MADE GOODS OF THEIR IN-
TERSTATE CHARAcTER - ORIGINAL
PACKAGE DocTint_-[Federal] The
defendant was convicted under an
Ohio statute (Oro GEN. CODE
(1933) §2228-1) prohibiting the re-
sale of prison-made goods on the
open market. On appeal, affirmed.
Held: The Hawes-Cooper Act (45
STAT. 1084 (1929), 49 U. S. C. A.
§60 (1935)), providing that "All
goods . . . produced by convicts
.. transported into any State
. . . shall upon arrival and de-
livery... be subject to the opera-
tion and effect of the laws of such
States . . . and shall not be ex-
empt therefrom by reason of being
introduced in the original package
or otherwise," divests prison-made
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goods of their interstate character
and removes constitutional restric-
tions on the power of a state to
regulate the resale of such inter-
state shipments though still in the
original package. Whitfield v. Ohio,
56 S. Ct. 532 (1936).
The federal power to prohibit the
shipment of goods in interstate
commerce has been held to be val-
idly exercised only when the sub-
ject matter is "illicit," such as
adulterated drugs and foods (Hipo-
lite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U. S. 45 (1911)), liquor (Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry.
Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917)), white
slaves (Hoke v. United States, 227
U. S. 308 (1913)), and lottery
tickets (Champion v. Ames, 188 U.
S. 321 (1903)), or where a misuse
of interstate commerce will result
in the spread of harm from the
state of origin to people of other
states. Brooks v. United States,
267 U. S. 432 (1925). On the other
hand, goods made by child labor,
which in themselves are harmless,
may not be prohibited from inter-
state commerce, since their manu-
facture, not being commerce, is be-
yond the control of Congress. Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251
(1918). The term "illicit" being
relative, there is room to criticize
the narrow definition given it by
the Court, since in the case of ad-
mittedly "illicit" goods, Congress
attempted, as also in the Child
Labor Law, to destroy the source
of production as well as to prevent
any harmful effect in other states
from the goods themselves. The
result has been to allow goods
manufactured under socially unde-
sirable conditions to circulate in
interstate commerce free from fed-
eral restraint, and to be sold with-
in a state, immune from local
regulation because goods still in
the original package were con-
sidered to be in the flow of inter-
state commerce and did not be-
come part of the general stock of
goods within the state until after
the original package was broken
or one resale had occurred. Leisy
v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1889).
See Snider, Growth of State Power
vnder Federal Constitution to
Regulate Traffic in Intoxicating
Liquors (1918) 25 W. Va. L. Q. 42.
The Hawes-Cooper Act, rather
than prohibiting interstate ship-
ments, merely removes whatever
immunity an original package
heretofore gave to interstate goods,
and permits state regulation to at-
tach effectively. See Dowling and
Hubbard, Divesting an. Article of
Its Interstate Character (1921) 5
Minn. L. Rev. 100. Heretofore, such
technique has been applied only
to liquor (In re Rahrer, 140 U. S.
545 (1891), which upheld the Wil-
son Act, 25 STAT. 313 (1890), 27
U. S. C. A. §121 (1935)), the inter-
state shipment of which Congress
might well have prohibited since it
was "illicit" (Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Md. Ry. Co., supra), so
that till now the question was un-
decided as to whether Congress
could apply this technique to non-
deleterious goods, such as those
made by prison labor, without ex-
ceeding its powers. The way now
seems open for similar federal stat-
utes relating to things other than
prison-made goods. See Cham-
bliss, Constitutional Code Control
(1936) 30 IlM. L. Rev. 829; Black,
The Significance of the Divesting
Theory in the Regulation of Milk
(1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 589. For ex-
ample, Congress, by enacting a law
subjecting goods made by child
labor to state laws might thus in-
duce states to pass complementary
laws relating thereto, though the
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desirability of using such a legal
method in lieu of the long con-
sidered child labor amendment is
debatable.
This decision will, in all proba-
bility, result in a further contrac-
tion of prison manufacturing, with
increased problems of prison ad-
ministration because of convict
idleness, since it paves the way for
other state statutes prohibiting the
resale of such goods. Under ap-
propriate statutes in pursuance of
the later Ashurst-Sumners Act, 49
STAT. 494, 49 U. S. C. A. §61 (1935),
prohibiting the interstate shipment
of goods in contravention of local
law, states could also prohibit the
entry of prison-made goods. With
a consequent narrowing of the
market, the ultimate effect will
probably be to limit production to
the state-use system. See Note
(1936) 26 J. Crim. L. 764.
MARVIn M. Fn M.
ASSIGNED EHOR AN GmqR
ExcEprox.-[Florida] Defendants
were convicted of larceny of three
cows. Upon appeal defendants as-
signed as error the charge given
by the trial court, to which only
general exception had been taken
below. Held: that objection can-
not be considered by the Supreme
Court unless the subject matter of
the objection has been properly
excepted to at the trial. And the
rule applies even when the error,
as here, consists of an obviously
incorrect charge as to the law of
the ease. Ward v. State. 166 So.
563 (Fla. 1936).
The erroneous charge, which the
trial court gave of its own motion,
was as follows: "The law is that
where one is found in the posses-
sion of such property, it is prima
facie evidence of his guilt of the
larceny of that property." The
statement is obviously incorrect:
it denies the presumption of inno-
cence (see Linden et al. v. United
States (C. C. A. 3rd, 1924), 296
Fed. 104), the rule as to burden of
proof, and in the event that the
defendants did not take the stand
is a judicial comment on that fact.
Nevertheless, the affirmance of the
judgment was based upon a well-
established rule, that objection will
not be heard unless the ruling of
the trial court has been the ground
of a specific exception, advising the
trial court of the objection so that
it had an opportunity to modify or
revise if such action should be
deemed necessary. (Cases so hold-
ing are collected in 16 C. J. §2647
and in the Current Digests for the
last ten years under the heading
of "Criminal Law," §1056-1 and
§1064-7. The cases are numerous
and are from almost all jurisdic-
tions.) The general rule, with
several exceptions or reservations
to be mentioned later, is well ex-
pressed in a recent Illinois case:
"The defendant is in no position to
urge that the giving of the instruc-
tion was erroneous, as an examina-
tion of the record fails to disclose
any objection made or an exception
taken to the giving of the instruc-
tion." People v. Reeves, 360 M]1. 55,
195 N. E. 443 (1935). See also
People v. Peck, 358 Ill. 642, 193 N.
E. 609 (1934). Similarly, a spe-
cific refusal to charge must be ex-
cepted to and assigned as error.
White v. State, 121 Fla. 128, 163 So.
403 (1935); Jindra v. United States,
69 F. (2d) 429 (1934).
The exceptions to the general
rule are: the Texas rule that ap-
peal will be allowed for "funda-
mental error" in the court's in-
structions even though no proper
exception was taken, Clayton v.
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State, 78 Tex. Cr. 78, 180 S. W.
1089 (1915); Holmes v. State, 70
Tex. Cr. 214, 156 S. W. 1172 (1913);
and the New Brunswick rule al-
lowing appeal for misdirection on
a material point, although proper
exception be lacking. In Rex. v.
Daley, 39 N. B. 411, at 416, the
court said: "I know of no rule
which deprives a person who is
convicted under a misdirection of
the trial judge of his right to a new
trial merely because he did not
complain of the misdirection at the
time." Some few States have pro-
visions in their statutes that appeal
is to be allowed in the absence of
proper exception, but this pro-
vision is usually limited to major
convictions. New York State has
such a statutory provision. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, Gilbert,
§527-528.)
Some courts, however, will not
affirm a judgment merely because
the proper exception was not taken
at the proper time if they are con-
vinced that justice demands a re-
versal. In this regard judicial
reasoning becomes extremely prac-
tical and rules of procedure are
no obstacle to an end which is
decided upon before the applica-
tion of the rules is worked out.
23 J. Crim. L. 28. Consequently,
it is no surprise to find Florida
cases which do not agree with the
principal case. In 1923 indictments
for murder were brought agaiust
three related defendants, and coi,-
victions were had for lesser of-
fenses. Apparently basing its ac-
tion on a belief that the convic-
tions were unreasonable or unjust,
the Supreme Court of Florida re-
versed without paying more than
cursory attention to the fact that
the defendants had not properly
excepted to the charge of the trial
court, as to which error was
claimed in the appeal. Ellis v.
State, 86 Fla. 165, 97 So. 285, 86
Fla. 257, 97 So. 520. But, instead
of being an occasional exception
to the general practice, appeal
should always be permitted-re-
gardless of technical rules-where
the trial court has misdirected the
jury as to the law of the case.
Judicial incompetency should not
be excused, or checkmated, by the
incompetency of defendant's coun-
sel. The defendant is likely enough
to suffer from both and, in the in-
terests of justice-that he shall not
suffer too much-the appellate
courts should not leave him help-
less.
JAMxS C. HALLAHAN.
